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ABSTRACT 
Global corporations breathed a sigh of relief when the United 
States Supreme Court held in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, that foreign 
corporations could not be defendants in suits brought under the 
Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The Jesner Court’s decision, however, did 
 not determine whether domestic corporations may be namable 
defendants in ATS cases. Whether victims of human rights violations 
can initiate ATS suits against U.S. corporations is now a question of 
much debate. This Article argues that U.S. corporations should be 
namable defendants in ATS lawsuits because such litigation (1) is 
consistent with the text, purpose, and history of the ATS; (2) involves 
enough of a domestic nexus to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality; (3) would not substantially endanger U.S. foreign 
relations; and (4) would be consistent with several circuit court 
decisions that recognize U.S. corporations as ATS defendants under 
the theory of civil aiding and abetting. 
INTRODUCTION 
lobal corporations breathed a sigh of relief when the Supreme 
Court held, in Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, that “foreign 
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the 
[Alien Tort Statute (ATS)].”1 The ATS provides U.S. courts with 
jurisdiction to review “any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United 
States.”2 The Court ruled that the ATS does not cover lawsuits against 
foreign corporations after considering the ATS’s text, precedent, and 
separation-of-powers principles.3 Concerns about damaging foreign 
relations and judicial overreach particularly influenced the Court’s 
decision.4 
1 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (2018). 
2 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2019). 
3 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1389–90. 
4 Id. at 1407. 
G 
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The Court’s decision in Jesner, however, did not determine whether 
domestic corporations may be defendants in suits brought under the 
ATS.5 Whether foreign victims of human rights violations can initiate 
ATS suits against U.S. corporations is now a question of much debate.6 
The debate is important because in the global supply chain economy, 
U.S. corporations are linked with numerous instances of human rights 
violations involving labor abuse, child slavery, extrajudicial killings, 
pollution, and war crimes.7 For example, courts have found that several 
U.S. corporations have financed and assisted the offshore activities of 
foreign goods suppliers that openly kidnap and enslave child workers.8 
In many supply chain cases, U.S. corporations are responsible and are 
the only actors capable of providing the victims with remedies.9 
5 See id. at 1390; Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018). 
6 Compare Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1124 (declaring that domestic corporations 
are namable defendants under the ATS), and Appellants’ Opposition to Petitions for 
Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 2–3, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (No. 17-
55435) (claiming that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner did not eliminate corporate 
liability to domestic corporations), with Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of 
Defendant-Appellee Cargill, Inc. at 17, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (No. 17-55435) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner casts doubt on the conclusion that 
domestic corporations are namable defendants under the ATS), and Brief of Amici Curiae 
Chamber of Commerce of United States, National Ass’n of Manufacturers, & Organization 
for International Investment in Support of Defendants-Appellees’ Petitions for Rehearing 
and Rehearing En Banc at 12–13, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (No. 17-55435) 
(arguing that domestic corporations should not be namable defendants under the ATS). See 
also MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 475 (7th ed. 
2015) (stating that it is states that are responsible for respecting, protecting, and fulfilling 
the rights of their citizens, and if they do not, they are answerable as states). 
7 See Douglass Cassel, Corporate Aiding and Abetting of Human Rights Violations: 
Confusion in the Courts, 6 NW. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 304, 305–06 (2008) (listing several 
U.S. corporations linked with allegations of global human rights violations); Gabrielle 
Holly, Lise Smit & Robert McCorquodale, Making Sense of Managing Human Rights 
Issues in Supply Chains 2018 Report and Analysis, BRITISH INST. OF INT’L AND 
COMPARATIVE LAW (2018), https://www.biicl.org/documents/1939_making_sense_of_ 
managing_human_rights_issues_in_supply_chains_-_2018_report_and_analysis_-_full_ 
text.pdf?showdocument=1 [hereinafter Making Sense of Managing Human Rights Issues in 
Supply Chains] (providing an overview of human rights violations issues in the global 
supply chain economy). 
8 See Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1122–23 (involving claim against Nestle corporation for 
allegedly aiding and abetting Ivory Coast cocoa farms that kidnap and enslave child 
workers). 
9 Gwynne Skinner, Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign 
Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
1769, 1799–1806 (2015) (claiming that corporate parent liability is warranted because 
foreign victims of human rights violations often cannot get remedies from subsidiary 
corporations in offshore host states). See also Sara Gold, S.C.O.T.U.S. Review Fall 2017, 
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This Article argues that U.S. corporations should be namable 
defendants in ATS lawsuits. Part I of this Article reviews the historical 
development of the ATS and ends with an overview of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Jesner. Part II explains why U.S. corporations 
should be namable defendants in ATS cases. Specifically, Part II argues 
that ATS litigation against U.S. corporations (1) is consistent with 
the text, purpose, and history of the ATS; (2) involves enough of a 
domestic nexus to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality; 
(3) would not substantially endanger U.S. foreign relations; and
(4) would be consistent with several circuit court decisions that
recognize U.S. corporations as ATS defendants under the theory of
civil aiding and abetting. Finally, this Article concludes with a review
of the implications of this study.
I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
In 1789, Congress enacted the ATS which states: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort 
only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.”10 The ATS was enacted to protect the United States 
from foreign entanglements by ensuring the availability of a federal 
forum where the failure to have one might cause another nation to hold 
the U.S. government responsible for an injury to a foreign citizen.11 The 
First Congress specifically enacted the ATS following a political 
embarrassment in which a French diplomat in the United States was 
assaulted and left without a remedy, as there was no legal cause of 
action in tort available to foreign citizens at the time.12 When Congress 
enacted the ATS, it had in mind three principal offenses: (1) violation 
of safe conducts, (2) infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and 
THE COMMENTARY (Oct. 21, 2017), https://cwslcommentary.com/2017/10/21/professors-
give-insight-into-2017-18-supreme-court-docket/ (quoting a professor claiming that if 
corporations are allowed to commit human rights abuse without liability, then governments 
could delegate human rights abuse to corporations). 
10 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
11 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (2018) (stating the purpose of 
the ATS); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–19, 739 (2004) (stating the purpose 
of the ATS). 
12 Martha Lovejoy, Note, From Aiding Pirates to Aiding Human Rights Abusers: 
Translating the Eighteenth-Century Paradigm of the Law of Nations for the Alien Tort 
Statute, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 241, 244 (2009). 
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(3) piracy.13 These three offenses were particularly concerning to
Congress because if these offenses took place without adequate redress
in the United States, it could give rise to an issue of war.14
Immediately after its passage, the ATS was raised in cases 
concerning seized ships and ship cargo.15 For example, in 1795, British 
nationals raised an ATS claim against U.S. citizens for “aiding a French 
ship in plundering British property.”16 Although the ATS fell into 
disuse during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it reappeared 
in 1980 in Filartiga v. Peña-Irala.17 There, the issue before the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals was whether it had jurisdiction under the ATS 
to review a wrongful death claim by a Paraguayan citizen against 
another Paraguayan who had tortured and killed her brother.18 The 
court ruled that jurisdiction was proper because the “law of nations” 
and “international law of human rights” clearly and unambiguously 
prohibited torture regardless of the nationality of the parties.19 
Whenever an alleged torturer was found and served with process by an 
alien within the borders of the United States, federal jurisdiction was 
appropriate.20 After the Second Circuit’s decision in Filartiga, foreign 
nationals increasingly began to raise ATS claims against individual and 
corporate defendants in the United States, on the grounds that the 
defendants violated the international law of human rights.21 
However, the Supreme Court narrowed the jurisdictional reach 
of the ATS when it reviewed, for the first time, a case involving the 
ATS’s scope in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.22 There, the Court ruled that 
the ATS was a jurisdictional statute that created no new cause of action 
13 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715. 
14 Id. 
15 Lovejoy, supra note 12, at 244. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. See Filartiga v. Peña-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1980). 
18 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. 
21 See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 847 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that the 
ATS requires no more than an allegation of a violation of the law of nations in order to 
invoke ATS jurisdiction); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. 
La. 1997) (involving an ATS suit against a corporation alleged to have committed 
environmental torts, human rights abuse, and cultural genocide in violation of the law of 
nations); Paul v. Avril, 901 F. Supp. 330, 335 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (awarding damages to ATS 
plaintiff for harms caused by defendant’s acts of torture in violation of the law of nations). 
22 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699, 712 (2004) (“We granted certiorari . . . 
to clarify the scope of . . . the ATS.”). 
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other than for claims involving three principal offenses that were 
commonly “accept[ed] among civilized nations” as violations of 
international law in the eighteenth century:23 (1) “offenses against 
ambassadors,”; (2) “violation of safe conducts,” and (3) “piracy.”24 
The Court limited the ATS to cover only these three offenses because 
the decision to create a new right of action was “better left to legislative 
judgment” in most cases, and the Court had “no congressional 
mandate” to seek out and define new and debatable international law 
violations.25 The Court also reasoned that U.S. courts should be 
“particularly wary of impinging on the discretion of the Legislative and 
Executive branches in managing foreign affairs.”26 Because the 
petitioner’s claim of “arbitrary detention” in Sosa did not fall within 
the meaning of any of the three eighteenth-century principal offenses, 
the Court ruled that the petitioner’s claim did not involve a tort 
committed in violation of the law of nations under the ATS.27 The 
Court’s holding served as the framework for evaluating jurisdictional 
issues under the ATS until the Court reexamined the ATS’s scope in 
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.28 
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court further narrowed the scope of the ATS 
when it ruled that the “presumption against extraterritoriality” applies 
to claims under the ATS.29 The presumption against extraterritoriality 
provides that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none.”30 The presumption “serves to 
protect against unintended clashes between [U.S.] laws and those of 
other nations which could result in international discord.”31 Because 
the Court found that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS 
rebutted the presumption,32 the Court ruled that the ATS does not cover 
claims in which “all the relevant conduct took place outside the United 
23 Id. at 732. 
24 Id. at 720. 
25 Id. at 727–28. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 738. 
28 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at 115 (citing Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 
(2010)). 
31 Id. (citing EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991)). 
32 Id. at 118–24 (explaining through several examples why the text, history, and purpose 
of the ATS did not rebut the presumption against extraterritoriality). 
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States.”33 The only exception is where the claims “touch and concern” 
the territory of the United States with “sufficient force” to displace 
the presumption against extraterritoriality.34 While articulating the 
exception, the Court neither explained the contours of the “touch and 
concern” test nor offered a workable way for lower courts to apply 
the test.35 The Court eventually returned to shed more light on 
extraterritoriality issues under the ATS in RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. 
European Community.36 
In RJR Nabisco, the Court provided a two-step framework for 
examining extraterritorial issues under the ATS.37 There, the Court 
stated that when reviewing a statute like the ATS, courts first must 
consider “whether the presumption against extraterritoriality has been 
rebutted—that is, whether the statute gives a clear, affirmative 
indication that it applies extraterritorially.”38 Courts can move on from 
step one only if the statute is not found to be extraterritorial.39 At step 
two, courts then consider the statute’s “focus” to determine whether the 
case involves a domestic application of the statute.40 If the conduct 
relevant to the statute’s “focus” occurred in the United States, then the 
case involves a permissible domestic application even if other conduct 
occurred abroad.41 However, if the relevant conduct occurred in a 
foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible extraterritorial 
application regardless of whether other conduct occurred in U.S. 
territory.42 The Court’s holding ultimately narrowed the scope of the 
ATS and left unanswered what corporate conduct fell outside the scope 
of the ATS. 
With respect to corporate defendants, the Court did not rule on the 
merits (in RJR Nabisco nor Kiobel) as to whether the jurisdictional 
33 Id. at 124–25. 
34 Id. 
35 Candra Connelly, The Alien Tort Statute: “An Avant-Garde Tool for Human Rights” 
or a Camoflaged Curse?, 87 U. CIN. L. REV. 203, 210 (2018); Michael J. Kelly, Atrocities 
by Corporate Actors: A Historical Perspective, 50 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 49, 82–83 
(2018). 
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scope of the ATS covered corporations.43 The Court ruled only that if 
all the “relevant conduct” took place outside U.S. territory, then ATS 
jurisdiction would not extend to suits against any defendant, regardless 
of whether the defendant is an individual or corporation.44 
Additionally, the Court did not apply Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test 
or RJR Nabisco’s “focus” test against corporate defendants.45 Instead, 
the Court in Kiobel briefly stated which corporate activities would not 
fall under the ATS.46 
In Kiobel, the Court established the “mere corporate presence” 
standard, which provides that corporations cannot be held liable under 
the ATS for merely being present at the time the relevant conduct took 
place.47 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts stated in dicta 
that “mere corporate presence” in the United States does not involve 
enough of a domestic nexus to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.48 Chief Justice Roberts did not explain what other 
factors were needed, beyond “mere corporate presence,” in order for a 
corporation to be a namable ATS defendant.49 In Justice Kennedy’s 
concurring opinion, he wrote that it was “proper” for the Court to 
“leave open a number of significant questions regarding the reach and 
interpretation of the [ATS].”50 However, in Justice Breyer’s concurring 
opinion, he discussed which corporate activities, beyond “mere 
corporate presence,” should fall under the ATS. 
In Justice Breyer’s concurring opinion, he proposed a standard for 
determining which corporate activities would allow a corporate 
defendant to fall under the scope of the ATS.51 Specifically, Justice 
Breyer claimed that a corporation should fall under the ATS’s scope 
when the corporation engages in conduct that “substantially and 
adversely affects an important American national interest.”52 Such an 
43 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1388–89 (2018). 
44 Id. 
45 See id. at 1406. 
46 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 125 (2013). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Connelly, supra note 35, at 209–10 (stating that the Court failed to provide a workable 
way for courts to determine ATS corporate liability); Kelly, supra note 35, at 82–83 (stating 
that the Court provided no guidance for what beyond “mere corporate presence” is sufficient 
to satisfy the “touch and concern” test). 
50 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
51 Id. at 127 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan joined 
Justice Breyer in advancing his standard. 
52 Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). 
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American interest is “substantially and adversely affected” when the 
conduct violates an international norm that is both “accepted by the 
civilized world” and “defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features” of the three principal eighteenth century offenses of 
(1) piracy, (2) violation of safe conducts, and (3) infringement of the
rights of ambassadors.53 For example, corporate conduct that provides
“safe harbor” in the United States for perpetrators of genocide would
“substantially and adversely affect” an important U.S. interest—and
thus be covered by the ATS—because perpetrators of genocide, like
pirates, are “common enemies of all mankind and all nations have an
equal interest in their apprehension and punishment.”54 Under Justice
Breyer’s approach, the ATS’s “jurisdictional reach” essentially
“match[es] the statute’s underlying substantive grasp.”55 That is, as
long as the corporate conduct in question is as universally condemned
as piracy, then the ATS would cover that conduct.56
However, the Supreme Court did not apply Justice Breyer’s 
approach from Kiobel to its decision in Jesner v. Arab Bank, which 
involved the question of whether foreign corporations can be named 
defendants in suits brought under the ATS.57 Instead, the Court 
established a bright-line rule that foreclosed ATS claims against any 
foreign corporation after considering the ATS’s text, precedent, and 
separation of powers concerns.58 Justice Kennedy, writing for the 
majority, in which Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas, Alito, 
and Gorsuch joined, reasoned that because Congress did not indicate 
through the language of the ATS that foreign corporations could be 
named defendants, “separation of powers concerns” counseled against 
“courts creating private rights of action.”59 The majority further noted 
that judicial restraint was warranted in the ATS context because the 
statute “implicate[d] foreign policy concerns that were the province of 
53 Id. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 699 
(2004)). 
54 Id. at 131 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
55 Id. at 132 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
56 Id. at 133–34 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
57 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018) (holding that foreign 
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS primarily because 
Congress was better suited to decide whether foreign corporations could be sued). 
58 Id. at 1389–90. 
59 Id. at 1403. 
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the political branches.”60 In order to avoid straining foreign relations, 
courts have a responsibility to defer to the better-trained branches of 
government in foreign policy judgments.61 Therefore, Justice Kennedy 
emphasized that, without further guidance from Congress, foreign 
corporations may not be defendants in suits brought under the ATS.62 
The majority’s decision categorically foreclosed foreign corporate 
liability without evaluating whether the foreign corporation’s conduct 
substantively fell under the ATS.63 
Writing for the dissent, in which Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Kagan joined, Justice Sotomayor argued that the “text, history, and 
purpose of the ATS, as well as the long and consistent history of 
corporate liability in tort,” confirmed that tort claims for law of nations 
violations could be brought against foreign corporations under the 
ATS.64 First, Justice Sotomayor reasoned that the phrase “[any] civil 
action[] for tort[]” from the ATS made clear that foreign corporations 
could be named defendants because “corporations have long been held 
liable in tort under federal common law.”65 The text also indicated that 
Congress did not intend to exclude foreign corporations from the 
ATS’s reach, given that the text limits the class of permissible plaintiffs 
to “alien[s]” but does not distinguish among classes of defendants.66 
Second, Justice Sotomayor claimed that the majority’s concerns 
about “separation of powers” and “foreign policy” were unwarranted 
because the executive branch and members of Congress repeatedly 
urged the Court that it “need not and should not foreclose corporate 
[tort] liability.”67 For example, the Attorney General and Solicitor 
General acknowledged to the Court that corporations could be held 
liable under the ATS.68 Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor noted that 
immunizing corporate violators of human rights from ATS liability 
would undermine the “system of accountability for law-of-nations 
violations that the First Congress endeavored to impose.”69 Justice 
Sotomayor called for the Court to decide Jesner not by categorically 
60 Id. at 1390. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 1407. 
63 Id. at 1419 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
64 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
65 Id. at 1425–26 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
66 Id. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
67 Id. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
68 Id. at 1426–27, 1431 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
69 Id. at 1437 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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barring ATS suits against foreign corporations.70 Instead, she urged the 
Court to consider (1) whether the corporation’s conduct sufficiently 
“touch[ed] and concern[ed] the United States,” and (2) whether 
the international law norms alleged to have been violated were of 
“sufficiently definite content and universal acceptance” to give rise to 
a cause of action under the ATS.71 Justice Sotomayor’s approach 
essentially combined the standards articulated in Kiobel.72 
*** 
Overall, the Supreme Court in Jesner did not eliminate all corporate 
liability under the ATS.73 In a five to four decision, the majority ruled 
only that foreign corporations may not be defendants in suits brought 
under the ATS.74 As long as a domestic corporation’s conduct 
sufficiently “touches and concerns the United States” and violates an 
international law norm of “sufficiently definite content and universal 
acceptance,”75 then the domestic corporation may be sued under the 
ATS. 
However, one school of thought contends that the majority’s 
reasoning in Jesner for excluding foreign corporations from ATS 
litigation applies equally to U.S. corporations.76 According to this view, 
70 Id. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
71 Id. (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
72 In Kiobel, Chief Justice Roberts declared that to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the ATS must “touch and concern” the U.S. with “sufficient force.” Then, 
Justice Breyer claimed that a corporation should fall under the ATS’s scope when the 
corporation engages in conduct that violates an international norm that is both “accepted by 
the civilized world” and “defined with a specificity comparable to the features” of the three 
principal eighteenth century offenses. Compare Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 
U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013) (articulating the “touch and concern” test of Chief Justice Roberts), 
with id. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring) (articulating Justice Breyer’s approach). 
73 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (2018). See also Doe v. Nestle, 
S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (“Jesner did not eliminate all corporate liability
under the ATS.”); William S. Dodge, Jesner v. Arab Bank: The Supreme Court Preserves
the Possibility of Human Rights Suits Against U.S. Corporations, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 26,
2018), https://www.justsecurity.org/55404/jesner-v-arab-bank-supreme-court-preserves-
possibility-human-rights-suits-u-s-corporations/ (stating that the Supreme Court preserved
the possibility of ATS suits against U.S. corporations after its decision in Jesner).
74 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1407. 
75 Id. at 1436 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
76 See Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Cargill, 
Inc. at 18, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (claiming that the Jesner Court’s reasoning 
with respect to foreign corporations applies equally to U.S. corporations). See also Jesner, 
138 S. Ct. at 1401 (plurality opinion) (Justice Kennedy, Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice 
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whether a corporation is foreign or domestic is irrelevant for purposes 
of ATS liability because there is no “specific, universal, and obligatory 
norm of corporate liability under currently prevailing international 
law.”77 The international community has not clearly and ubiquitously 
taken the step of subjecting corporations to “liability for the crimes of 
their human agents.”78 
This school of thought further claims that subjecting domestic 
corporations to ATS liability would “discourage[] American 
corporations from investing abroad,” including in developing countries 
where “economic development . . . often is an essential foundation for 
human rights.”79 According to the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, ATS 
plaintiffs have filed lawsuits against dozens of major U.S. corporations 
with respect to their activities in developing and post-conflict 
countries.80 More than half of those corporations are listed on the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average, and they have spent millions of dollars 
litigating in court for dozens of years.81 According to this school of 
thought, permitting ATS plaintiffs to sue U.S. corporations would 
effectively empower a single plaintiff to both “embargo [U.S.] trade 
with foreign nations” and “forc[e] the judiciary to trench upon the 
authority of Congress and the President.”82 
Notwithstanding the force and weight of this school of thought, 
stronger grounds exist for holding U.S. corporations accountable under 
the ATS. As shown in Part II, the text, purpose, and history of the ATS 
and the existing body of case law demonstrate that U.S. corporations 
should be namable defendants under the ATS. 
Roberts claiming that there is weak support for finding a specific, universal, and obligatory 
norm of corporate liability under the ATS). 
77 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1401 (plurality opinion) (stating the views of Justice Kennedy, 
Justice Thomas, and Chief Justice Roberts). 
78 Id. at 1402 (plurality opinion). 
79 Id. at 1406 (plurality opinion). 
80 Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of United States, National Ass’n of 
Manufacturers, & Organization for International Investment in Support of Defendants-
Appellees’ Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 16, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 
F.3d 1120 (No. 17-55435).
81 See id.
82 Id. at 14.
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II 
THE SCOPE OF THE ATS SHOULD COVER U.S. CORPORATIONS 
The Supreme Court’s decision in Jesner left open the possibility of 
naming U.S. corporations as defendants in ATS lawsuits.83 Several 
grounds exist for why the ATS should cover U.S. corporate defendants: 
(1) ATS litigation against U.S. corporations is consistent with the
text, purpose, and legislative history of the ATS; (2) ATS litigation
against U.S. corporations involves enough of a domestic nexus to
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality; (3) naming U.S.
corporations as ATS defendants would not substantially endanger U.S.
foreign relations; and (4) federal courts have increasingly recognized
domestic corporations as ATS defendants, particularly under the theory
of civil aiding and abetting.84
A. ATS Litigation Against U.S. Corporations Is Consistent with the
Text, Purpose, and History of the ATS
Courts generally agree that statutory interpretation begins with the
plain and ordinary meaning of the text.85 The text is to be “construed 
reasonably[] to contain all that it fairly means.”86 But when the text of 
a statute is ambiguous or unclear, courts have looked to the statute’s 
purpose and history for additional guidance.87 With respect to the ATS, 
83 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (2018); see also Doe v. Nestle, 
S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (stating that Jesner did not eliminate domestic
corporate liability under the ATS).
84 See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1124 (reviewing an ATS claim against a U.S. 
corporation). See also Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 834 F.3d 201, 213 (2d Cir. 
2016) (same); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 191–94 (2d Cir. 2014) (same); Sarei 
v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 765 (9th Cir. 2011) (same); Presbyterian Church of Sudan
v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009) (same).
85 The Supreme Court has begun statutory interpretation by looking to the plain and
ordinary meaning of the text in several recent cases. See King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 
2488 (2015); Hughes v. U. S., 138 S. Ct. 1765, 1775 (2018); Wis. Cnt., Ltd. v. U. S., 138 S. 
Ct. 2067, 2070–71 (2018). 
86 ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW 23 (1997). 
87 Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 845, 848 (1992) (“Legislative history helps a court understand the context and
purpose of a statute. Outside the law we often turn to context and purpose to clarify
ambiguity.”).
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the text, purpose, and history of the statute demonstrate that ATS suits 
may be brought against domestic corporations.88 
1. Text
The ATS’s express grant of jurisdiction to hear “any civil action”
for “tort[s]” indicates that the statute covers all the “cluster of ideas” 
attached to the word “tort,” including corporate tort liability.89 
Whenever Congress creates a tort action, it “legislates against a legal 
background of ordinary tort-related . . . rules and consequently intends 
its legislation to incorporate those rules,” unless it instructs otherwise.90 
In Jesner, Justice Sotomayor’s textual analysis of the ATS was 
premised on this principle with respect to foreign corporations;91 with 
respect to domestic corporations, however, Justice Sotomayor’s 
reasoning applies with even greater force. Compared to foreign 
corporations, U.S. corporations have long been held liable in tort under 
federal common law.92 For example, in Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 
v. Quigley, the Supreme Court ruled that a Maryland-based railroad
company could be liable for its agents’ tortious conduct committed
during the course of business.93 The Court observed that it was long
“decided in Great Britain, as well as in the United States, that actions
might be maintained against [such] corporations for torts; and instances
[were] found, in the judicial annals of both countries, of suits for torts
arising from the acts of their agents, of nearly every variety.”94 The
Jesner majority ultimately rejected this line of reasoning, as Quigley
concerned a Maryland-based corporation while Jesner concerned a
foreign corporation.95 However, the Supreme Court would be hard-
88 The ATS reads: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action 
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the 
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2019). 
89 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1425 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
90 Id. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Meyer v. Holley, 537 U.S. 280, 285 
(2003)). 
91 Id. at 1425–26. 
92 See, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210 (1858) 
(“[A]ctions might be maintained against corporations for torts); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Brewer, 12 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (ruling that a corporation may be liable under 
tort law for the slanderous acts of its employees); United Cigar Stores Co. v. Young, 36 
App. D.C. 390, 405, 407 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (same). 
93 Quigley, 62 U.S. at 210. 
94 Id. 
95 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1390 (“[F]oreign corporations may not be defendants in suits 
brought under the ATS.”). 
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pressed to distinguish Quigley’s holding when applied to domestic 
corporations under the ATS. 
The ATS’s text further suggests that domestic corporations may be 
namable ATS defendants, given that the statute includes the word 
“alien” to limit the class of permissible plaintiffs and omits any word 
that distinguishes among classes of defendants.96 Several courts have 
noted this subtlety in the text and concluded that domestic corporations 
could be sued under the ATS.97 For example, in Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that a Texas-based 
corporation could be sued under the ATS, after acknowledging that 
the terms of the ATS expressed no limitation on the class of permissible 
defendants.98 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals similarly noted 
that “the text of the [ATS] provides no express exception for 
corporations,” and ruled that “this statute grant[ed] jurisdiction” for 
the plaintiff’s complaint against an Alabama-based corporation.99 
Similarly, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that bringing suit 
against a Tennessee-based corporation was possible under the ATS, in 
part because the text of the statute “is an objection not to corporate 
liability.”100 In all these cases “Congress could [have] curtail[ed] [the 
ATS’s] scope” by limiting the class of available defendants but did not 
do so.101 Congress’s silence has led many Circuits to assume that U.S. 
corporations can be sued under the ATS.102 
96 Id. at 1426 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (citing Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 438 (1989)). See also Kristin L. Leveille, Note, A Debate 
Two Hundred Years in the Making: Corporate Liability and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality Under the Alien Tort Statute, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 653, 683 (2012) 
(claiming that any defendant that violates customary international law can be held liable 
under the ATS, given that the text states “any civil action” and does not distinguish between 
classes of defendants). 
97 See Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 43 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Flomo v. Firestone 
Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th Cir. 2011). Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 
F.3d 1252, 1263 (11th Cir. 2009); Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th
Cir. 2008); Al-Quraishi v. Nakhla, 728 F. Supp. 2d 702, 753 (D. Md. 2010); In re Agent
Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 7, 55–56, 58 (E.D.N.Y. 2005) (noting that
whereas the TVPA uses the term “individual” to describe the class of defendants, the ATS
uses no such term; and concluding that “[l]imiting civil liability to individuals while
exonerating the corporation directing the individual’s action through its complex operations
and changing personnel makes little sense in today’s world”).
98 Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 43. 
99 Romero, 552 F.3d at 1315. 
100 Flomo, 643 F.3d at 1020–21. 
101 Id. at 1016. 
102 Id. at 1017. 
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2. Purpose
The purpose of the ATS is to provide redress to those who have been
victims of torts in violation of the law of nations.103 The ATS aims to 
ensure the availability of a U.S. forum where the failure to have one 
might cause another nation to hold the U.S. government responsible for 
an injury to a foreign citizen.104 Indeed, Congress enacted the ATS after 
a political embarrassment in 1784 where a French diplomat was 
assaulted and left remediless.105 
Now that Jesner ruled that foreign corporations cannot be 
defendants in suits brought under the ATS,106 the statute would be 
empty rhetoric to thousands of victims of human rights violations if 
domestic corporations were also exempted. In the global supply chain 
economy, U.S. corporations are often the only actors from whom the 
victims can obtain remedies.107 In a common ATS supply chain 
scenario, a U.S. corporation purchases goods through a supplier located 
in a foreign host state.108 The goods typically originate as raw material, 
and the supplier gathers the goods either directly or indirectly through 
subcontracted farmers and laborers.109 In many instances, the supplier 
and subcontractors perpetuate human rights abuses at the local level of 
a host state, for example, by kidnapping and enslaving adolescent 
workers.110 These victims often cannot obtain redress other than 
through ATS litigation against the U.S. corporation.111 
103 Connelly, supra note 35, at 217 (“The purpose, which has been stated time and time 
again, is to provide a method of redress for those that have been the victims of violations of 
the laws of nations.”). 
104 See Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1389 (2018) (stating the purpose of 
the ATS); Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715–19 (2004) (same). 
105 Lovejoy, supra note 12, at 244. 
106 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1389. 
107 Skinner, supra note 9, at 1799–1806 (claiming that corporate parent liability is 
warranted because foreign victims of human rights violations often cannot get remedies 
from subsidiary corporations in offshore host states). 
108 See generally Respecting Human Rights Through Global Supply Chains, SHIFT 3 
(October 2012), https://www.shiftproject.org/media/resources/docs/Shift_UNGPssupply 
chain2012.pdf [hereinafter Respecting Human Rights Through Global Supply Chains] 
(describing typical supply chain structures and adverse impacts on human rights). 
109 Id. See Human Rights in Supply Chains: A Call for a Binding Global Standard on 
Due Diligence, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (May 30, 2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/ 
2016/05/30/human-rights-supply-chains/call-binding-global-standard-due-diligence. 
110 See, e.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2018). 
111 Gwynne L. Skinner, Beyond Kiobel: Providing Access to Judicial Remedies for 
Violations of International Human Rights Norms by Transnational Business in a New (Post-
Kiobel) World, 46 COLUM. HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 158, 169–71 (2014) (describing the 
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First, many victims are unable to obtain remedies in the host state 
due to a lack of effective remedial mechanisms.112 The host state often 
lacks the requisite finances, access, and training to evaluate the claims 
involving U.S. corporate activities, or may lack an independent and 
effective judiciary.113 Second, the targets of ATS litigation in the host 
state often shift the blame to the U.S. corporation.114 Many host state 
business associates of the U.S. corporation, for example, have argued 
that a U.S. good, service, or directive caused the injury in the host 
state.115 Third, many host states lack pro bono legal services, which 
are essential to indigent victims.116 The inability to hire lawyers in 
many host states has resulted in lack of representation for many 
victims.117 Fourth, the targets of litigation in the host state often 
retaliate against the victims for initiating litigation.118 The victims often 
face arbitrary detention, torture, or even death when they attempt to sue 
their supervisors or local authorities.119 Finally, lawsuits against local 
officials or corporate employees in their individual capacities often fail 
to fully compensate the victims.120 The officials often lack the personal 
resources to fully remedy the harm to the victims.121 Taken together, 
numerous challenges to obtaining redress in the host state necessitate 
ATS litigation against U.S. corporations. This litigation would further 
the ATS’s purpose of providing redress to those who have been victims 
of torts in violation of the law of nations.122 
challenges victims face in obtaining remedies, given that host countries often fail to remedy 
harms caused by transnational corporations). 
112 Id. at 169. 
113 Id. at 170–71. 
114 See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, 809 F.2d 195, 198 
(2d Cir. 1987) (noting how Indian officials directed plaintiffs to bring suit again U.S. 
defendant in the U.S.). See also Eri Osaka, Corporate Liability, Government Liability, and 
the Fukushima Nuclear Disaster, 21 PAC. RIM L. & POL’Y J. 433, 453–54 (2012) (claiming 
that U.S. corporation is legally responsible in part for Fukushima tort incident). 
115 See, e.g., Osaka, supra note 114, at 453–54. 
116 Skinner, supra note 111, at 172. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. 
119 See generally id. 
120 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1435 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(stating that individual employees of a business are less likely to be able to fully compensate 
successful ATS plaintiffs). 
121 Id. 
122 See Connelly, supra note 35, at 217. 
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Moreover, excluding private U.S. corporations from the ATS’s 
reach would undermine the statute’s aim of “ensuring the availability 
of a federal forum where the failure to have one might cause another 
nation to hold the United States [government] responsible for an 
injury to a foreign citizen.”123 Compared to injuries caused by a foreign 
corporation, injuries caused by a U.S. corporation would lead more 
foreign nationals to fault the U.S. government if American courts and 
legislators categorically deny them from seeking justice against the 
U.S. corporation under the ATS.124 Like the French diplomat who was 
injured and left remediless in 1784,125 foreign nationals injured by a 
U.S. corporation and left with no recourse against that corporation 
under the ATS would view the U.S. government as partaking in a 
“scandal.”126 The Jesner Court was less concerned about the U.S. 
government receiving such blame because the corporate defendant, 
Arab Bank PLC, was a “foreign corporate entity,” a centerpiece of 
“Jordan’s economy,” and a power player in the “Amman Stock 
Exchange.”127 Having no forum under the ATS to sue Arab Bank for 
its torts would not cause victims to fault the U.S. government as much 
as having no such forum to review torts committed by U.S. 
corporations.128 Furthermore, some courts have acknowledged that host 
state victims should rightfully blame and seek redress from U.S. 
corporations for financing, assisting, and directing egregious supply-
chain practices.129 These victims, like the injured French diplomat in 
1784, would be without legal recourse if U.S. corporations were 
excluded from the ATS’s reach.130 Under such a scenario, the victim’s 
123 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1389. See also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 761 
(2004) (Breyer, J., concurring). 
124 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1416 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (suggesting that the U.S. 
government would rightfully face more “reprisals” for torts committed by U.S. entities than 
for those committed by foreign entities). 
125 Lovejoy, supra note 12, at 244. 
126 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1417 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 1394, 1407 (emphasis added). 
128 Id. at 1419 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“It is one thing for courts to assume the task of 
creating new causes of action to ensure our citizens [and corporations] abide by the law of 
nations and avoid reprisals against this country. It is altogether another thing for courts to 
punish foreign parties [and corporations] for conduct that could not be attributed to the 
United States and thereby risk reprisals against this country.”). 
129 See, e.g., Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1122–23 (involving ATS claim against Nestle 
corporation for allegedly aiding and abetting Ivory Coast cocoa farms that kidnap and 
enslave child workers). 
130 Skinner, supra note 111, at 171–73 (describing the challenges victims face in 
obtaining remedies through means outside the ATS). 
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home country would be disappointed in the United States for not 
“ensuring the availability of a federal forum.”131 
3. History
The history of the ATS further indicates that ATS suits may be
brought against U.S. corporations.132 Although the ATS lacks a formal 
legislative history,133 the historical context during which it was enacted 
suggests that the ATS was meant to cover domestic corporations.134 
When the ATS was passed in 1789, corporate tort liability was an 
accepted principle of tort law in the U.S.135 Several state supreme courts 
recognized that a domestic corporation could be liable for the torts of 
its agents.136 For example, in Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks & 
Canals, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts reviewed several 
contemporaneous treatises and cases, and concluded that an action in 
tort may lie against a corporation.137 Similarly, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court found, after reviewing several publications and 
American cases, that it was “beyond doubt” that a corporation could be 
liable for torts committed by its agents.138 
Federal authorities and court decisions also suggest that domestic 
corporations could be sued when the ATS was enacted.139 Attorney 
General William Bradford noted in a 1795 opinion that the Sierra 
Leone Company could raise a claim as a plaintiff under the ATS.140 The 
Attorney General voiced no concern about a corporation’s capacity 
to litigate under the ATS, suggesting that corporations could also 
131 Jesner, 138 S. Ct. at 1397. 
132 Kelly, supra note 35, at 77 (stating that the ATS has evolved throughout history to 
include claims against corporations). 
133 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 718 (2004). 
134 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 47–48 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (stating that 
“corporate liability in tort was an accepted principle of tort law in the United States”), 
vacated on other grounds by Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 527 Fed. Appx. 7, 7 (D.C. Cir. 
2013). 
135 See Skinner, supra note 111, at 188. 
136 Riddle v. Proprietors of the Locks & Canals, 7 Mass. 169, 186 (1810); Chestnut Hill 
& Spring House Tpk. Co. v. Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle 6, 18 (Pa. 1818). 
137 Riddle, 7 Mass. at 186. 
138 Rutter, 4 Serg. & Rawle at 18. 
139 See, e.g., Trs. of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 667 (1819) (holding 
that corporations can sue and be sued). 
140 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2011), vacated on other 
grounds by Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 527 Fed. Appx. 7, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
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be named ATS defendants.141 Furthermore, in Trs. of Dartmouth 
College v. Woodward, the Supreme Court held that a corporation was 
not immune from all lawsuits.142 The Court described a corporation as 
“a collection of individuals, united into one collective body, under a 
special name,” and ruled that such a collective body could “be[] 
sued.”143 After analogizing corporations to “real person[s],” the Court 
observed that “corporations exist[] in every country governed by 
the common law.”144 Moreover, several modern federal courts have 
interpreted the time when the ATS was enacted as a period when 
“corporations, like individuals, [were] liable for their torts.”145 The 
recognition of corporate tort liability by state and federal courts when 
the ATS was enacted indicates that ATS litigation against U.S. 
corporations was also permissible at the time. 
B. ATS Litigation Against U.S. Corporations “Touch and Concern”
the Territory of the United States with “Sufficient Force” to
Overcome the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court held that the “presumption against
extraterritoriality” applies to claims under the ATS, and that 
ATS claims will be recognized only if they “touch and concern” the 
territory of the United States with “sufficient force” to displace the 
presumption.146 The Court similarly held, in RJR Nabisco, Inc., that to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality, courts must 
consider the statute’s “focus” to determine whether the case involves a 
domestic application of the statute.147 If the conduct relevant to the 
statute’s “focus” occurred in the United States, then the case involves 
a permissible domestic application even if other conduct occurred 
abroad.148 
The Supreme Court did not explain the contours of, or the difference 
between, Kiobel’s “touch and concern” test and RJR Nabisco’s 
“focus” test in the context of ATS litigation.149 However, ATS 
141 Id. 
142 Woodward, 17 U.S. at 667. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 667. 
145 Exxon Mobil, 654 F.3d at 48; White v. Cent. Dispensary & Emergency Hosp., 99 
F.2d 355, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1938).
146 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013).
147 RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Comm., 136 S. Ct. 2090, 2101 (2016).
148 Id.
149 Connelly, supra note 35, at 210.
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practitioners generally agree that the two tests concur in concluding 
that the ATS will apply if the relevant conduct giving rise to the 
claim took place inside U.S. territory.150 With respect to corporate 
defendants, courts have shown more willingness to find that the 
presumption against extraterritoriality was overcome where (1) the 
defendant was a U.S. business; (2) some decision-making leading to 
the abuses occurred in the United States; (3) products from the illegal 
activity came into the United States; (4) a substantial U.S. interest was 
affected in some way; (5) the claim alleged serious human rights 
violations by a business active within the United States; or (6) some 
combination of the above.151 These factors taken together demonstrate 
that ATS claims may be brought against U.S. corporations. 
First, domestic corporations are, by definition, incorporated in the 
United States pursuant to laws of incorporation, such as the Revised 
Model Business Corporation Act or Certificate of Incorporation of 
Delaware’s General Corporation Law (DGCL).152 Although U.S. 
corporations may have offices located in several foreign countries, they 
are “at home” in the United States for purposes of jurisdiction.153 
Second, U.S. corporations are often involved in “some decision-
making” linked to the abuse in the offshore host state. U.S. corporations 
often make financial, planning, and enforcement decisions to protect 
their interests, despite the occurrence of egregious harm to local 
laborers and the host state’s environment.154 For example, the Second 
Circuit found in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp. that the actions of a U.S. 
corporation were decisive for purposes of the Kiobel “touch and 
concern” test because the corporation purchased, financed, and 
transported oil to the offshore human rights violator, and it created and 
managed an escrow account to enable illicit payments for that 
violator.155 
150 Id. 
151 Skinner, supra note 111, at 198. 
152 WILLIAM T. ALLEN & REINIER KRAAKMAN, COMMENTARIES AND CASES ON THE 
LAW OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATION 82 (5th ed. 2016). 
153 Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 127 (2014). 
154 Respecting Human Rights Through Global Supply Chains, supra note 108, at 18–20 
(reviewing how corporations can make better decisions to decrease human rights risks); 
Making Sense of Managing Human Rights Issues in Supply Chains, supra note 7, at 5 
(stating that a company may cause or contribute to an adverse human rights impact in its 
supply chain). 
155 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). 
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Third, U.S corporations in global supply chain cases often receive 
products deriving from activities that create adverse impacts on human 
rights in the offshore host state.156 For example, in Doe v. Exxon Mobil 
Corp., a Texas-based corporation imported oil from an Indonesian site 
where the corporation’s security forces allegedly committed murder, 
torture, sexual assault, battery, and false imprisonment.157 In Romero v. 
Drummond Co., an Alabama-based corporation received coal from a 
Colombian subsidiary that allegedly paid paramilitary operatives to 
torture and assassinate leaders of a Colombian trade union.158 
Similarly, in Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., a U.S. corporation 
imported rubber from a Liberian plantation that allegedly abused child 
workers.159 
Fourth, a “substantial U.S. interest is affected” when a U.S. 
corporation perpetuates human rights abuse in violation of the law of 
nations.160 The victims often blame the U.S. corporation as the director 
of the supply chain operation.161 The U.S. economy might also have 
less market access if host states expel U.S. investors and subsidiaries 
from their countries on grounds of human rights abuse.162 Unlike the 
operations of foreign corporations, those of U.S. corporations directly 
implicate the interests of the U.S. 
Fifth, ATS claims against U.S. corporations often do not involve 
serious human rights violations by a business active within the United 
States; the direct abuse of human rights usually occurs in the foreign 
156 Respecting Human Rights Through Global Supply Chains, supra note 108, at 3; 
Trade Promotion and Human Rights: How States Should Use Economic Diplomacy 
to Incentivize Business Respect for Human Rights, UN HUM. RTS. OFF. OF THE  
HIGH COMMISSIONER (June 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Business/ 
ExecutiveSummaryReportEconomicDiplomacy.pdf [hereinafter Trade Promotion and 
Human Rights] (stating that trade, exports, and imports of goods in global supply chains can 
have significant adverse human rights impacts). 
157 Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
158 Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008). 
159 Flomo v. Firestone Nat’l Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1015 (7th Cir. 2011). 
160 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 133 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring) (stating that the U.S. has an interest in not becoming a safe harbor for violators 
of the most fundamental international norms). 
161 See, e.g., Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1123 (9th Cir. 2018) (involving an ATS 
suit by Ivory Coast plaintiffs against the U.S. corporation that spearheaded the entire supply 
chain). 
162 Bill Reinsch, The Alien Tort Statute’s Impact on the Business Community, WORLD 
COM. REV. 29 (June 2012), http://www.worldcommercereview.com/publications/article_ 
pdf/612 (describing how revenue and hundreds of thousands of U.S. jobs could be lost if 
U.S. corporations withdraw from host countries). 
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host state.163 However, the U.S. corporation may still play an active role 
domestically while perpetuating those violations abroad; for example, 
by aiding and abetting the perpetrator.164 In Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 
the Second Circuit found that a corporation headquartered in California 
could be liable for actively aiding and abetting its beneficiaries in 
committing torture in Iraq.165 
Taken together, many of the key factors that courts consider when 
determining whether there is enough of a domestic nexus to overcome 
the presumption of extraterritoriality indicate that ATS claims may be 
maintained against U.S. corporations. Although each factor alone may 
be insufficient to find that an act “touches and concerns” U.S. territory, 
the factors taken together provide strong grounds to permit ATS suits 
against U.S. corporations. 
C. ATS Litigation Against U.S. Corporations Would Not
Substantially Endanger U.S. Foreign Relations
A principal reason why the Supreme Court ruled in Jesner that ATS 
suits may not be brought against foreign corporations was that such 
suits would threaten U.S. foreign relations.166 The Jesner Court’s 
reasoning, however, loses much force when applied to domestic 
corporations. Unlike foreign corporations, U.S. corporations are not 
under the primary authority of another sovereign. Thus, ATS suits 
against U.S. corporations would not challenge the sovereignty of 
another nation like the Jesner plaintiff’s suit challenged the sovereignty 
of Jordan.167 In Jesner, the Court observed that the plaintiff’s suit 
against Arab Bank PLC, a Jordanian corporation, “caused significant 
diplomatic tensions with Jordan, a critical ally” of the United States.168 
Jordan expressly considered the ATS litigation to be a “grave 
163 Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of United States, National Ass’n of 
Manufacturers, & Organization for International Investment in Support of Defendants-
Appellees’ Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 15, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 
F.3d 1120 (No. 17-55435). See, e.g., Cassel, supra note 7, at 305–06; Respecting Human
Rights Through Global Supply Chains, supra note 108, at 3.
164 Cassel, supra note 7, at 305–06 (listing several cases involving ATS claims against 
U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting). 
165 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 195 (2d Cir. 2014). 
166 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018). 
167 Id. at 1390. 
168 Id. at 1406. 
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affront” to its sovereignty.169 According to an amicus brief filed by the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the thirteen-year-old ATS suit 
“expos[ed] Arab Bank to massive liability, [and] thus threaten[ed] to 
destabilize Jordan’s economy and undermine its cooperation with the 
United States.”170 Other countries, such as South Africa, Germany, and 
the United Kingdom, similarly objected to ATS suits against their 
respective domestic corporations.171 However, when ATS claims are 
made against U.S. corporations, the United States would not face such 
disapproval from another country. 
To be sure, another country might be disappointed in the United 
States if an ATS suit against a U.S. corporation caused the U.S. 
corporation to extract its investments, subsidiaries, and development 
projects from that country for fear of ATS liability.172 That host country 
might lose all the benefits it derives from the U.S. corporation’s 
economic activities in its country.173 However, evidence of U.S. 
corporations pulling out from foreign host states for such reasons 
is sparse.174 In fact, despite a boom of over 150 ATS cases against 
corporations within the past several decades, the number of 
transnational corporations has surged from approximately 7,000 in 
1970 to approximately 100,000 in 2010.175 In addition, most U.S. 
corporations that were targeted in ATS suits have not stopped their 
economic activities in the host states.176 For example, Exxon Mobil 
Corporation still conducts business activities in Indonesia even though 
169 Id. at 1407. 
170 Id. (citing Brief for Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Respondent at 3, Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1407 (2018)). 
171 Id. 
172 See Reinsch, supra note 162, at 29–30. 
173 Id. 
174 Skinner, supra note 111, at 168–69 (reviewing the growth of transnational 
corporations despite increases in ATS litigation). 
175 Id. at 168. 
176 For example, Exxon Mobil still does business in Indonesia despite its experience as 
an ATS defendant. Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011). See Exxon 
Mobil in Indonesia, EXXONMOBIL (2019), https://www.exxonmobil.co.id/en-id/company/ 
about-us/about-us. In addition, Firestone National Rubber Co. still operates in Liberia after 
undergoing ATS litigation. Flomo v. Firestone Nat. Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1016 (7th 
Cir. 2011). See About Firestone Liberia, FIRESTONE NAT. RUBBER CO. (2019), 
https://www.firestonenaturalrubber.com/. Similarly, Drummond Co. continued its business 
in Columbia after being sued under the ATS. Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 
1315 (11th Cir. 2008). See Our Products: Mines – Columbia, DRUMMOND CO. (2019), 
http://www.drummondco.com/our-products/coal/mines/. 
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it was subjected to years of costly ATS litigation.177 Chevron 
Corporation also still operates its oil mining operations in Ecuador 
despite having lost a lawsuit.178 Furthermore, there is little evidence 
that host countries would be worse off if U.S. corporations were 
to pull out.179 Indeed, according to impact assessments, Chevron 
Corporation’s oil mining operations in Ecuador caused broad social 
discontent and over $100 billion in environmental damage;180 thus, not 
pulling out and not abiding by human rights and environmental laws 
might actually worsen U.S. foreign relations.181 
Moreover, the Jesner Court’s argument that the judiciary is not 
well suited to decide issues that implicate U.S. foreign policy applies 
with less force in the context of U.S. corporations.182 In Jesner, the 
Court emphasized that issues implicating foreign policy belonged to 
“the province of the political branches.”183 The Court stated that 
diplomatic tensions would result from a holding that foreign 
corporations could be sued under the ATS.184 However, when the ATS 
177 Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d at 15. See ExxonMobil in Indonesia, EXXONMOBIL 
(2019), https://www.exxonmobil.co.id/en-id/company/about-us/about-us (reviewing 
ExxonMobil’s current presence in Indonesia). 
178 Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 833 F.3d 74, 84 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that trial court in 
Ecuador entered judgment against Chevron for over $8 billion in damages, even though 
Chevron would eventually get relieved from paying that remedy). 
179 See generally Rosa Forte & Rui Moura, The Effect of Foreign Direct Investment on 
the Host Country’s Economic Growth: Theory and Empirical Evidence, 58 SINGAPORE 
ECON. REV. 3 (2013) (concluding that the effects of foreign direct investment are not always 
beneficial and that there are negative effects); Andrew T. Guzman, Why LDCs Sign Treaties 
That Hurt Them: Explaining the Popularity of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 38 VA. J. INT’L 
L. 639, 643 (1998) (claiming that while bilateral investment treaties “increase global
efficiency, they likely reduce the overall welfare of developing states”). See also Diane A.
Desierto, Development as an International Right: Investment in the New Trade-Based IIAs,
3 TRADE L. & DEV. 296, 320–22 (2011) (reviewing the various meanings of “development”
in international investment agreements and concluding that measurements of economic
development are not uniform and often do not take into account all possible socioeconomic
variables that show negative effects of international investment agreements).
180 See Texaco/Chevron Lawsuits (re Ecuador), BUS. & HUM. RTS. RESOURCE CTR., 
https://www.business-humanrights.org/en/texacochevron-lawsuits-re-ecuador. 
181 See, e.g., id. See also Diane A. Desierto, Calibrating Human Rights and Investment 
in Economic Emergencies: Prospects of Treaty and Valuation Defenses, 9 MANCHESTER  
J. INT’L ECON. L. 162, 164 (2012) (stating that as a matter of normative and policy priority
during an economic emergency, a host state might interrupt investment agreements with
foreign investors in order to protect the social and economic rights of its citizens).
182 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1390 (2018). 
183 Id. at 1390. 
184 Id. 
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defendant is a U.S. corporation in U.S. territory, it is the duty of the 
Court to adjudicate issues concerning domestic corporate tort 
liability.185 The Court would not implicate serious U.S. foreign policy 
concerns by deciding such issues, even if the claims related to offshore 
corporate activities.186 The Court has regularly recognized jurisdiction 
to review the offshore activities of U.S. corporations under other 
federal statutes.187 For example, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized the application of U.S. antitrust laws, including the 
Sherman Act and the Clayton Act, against U.S. corporations for their 
domestic and offshore activities.188 The Court has also applied the Civil 
Rights Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, and the 
Americans with Disabilities Act against U.S. corporations for conduct 
performed abroad.189 Thus, the Court’s duty to adjudicate issues of 
domestic importance and to apply federal statutes in a consistent 
fashion militate in favor of permitting ATS litigation against U.S. 
corporations. 
D. Modern Usage of the Corporate Aiding and Abetting Theory
Warrants ATS Litigation Against U.S. Corporations 
The number of ATS lawsuits against global corporations has grown 
to over 150 since the 1970s.190 Over ninety-five percent of ATS 
lawsuits involve allegations of aiding and abetting.191 Although most 
courts eventually dismissed those allegations, they did so on grounds 
unrelated to the merits of the aiding and abetting claims.192 If U.S. 
185 See, e.g., Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. v. Quigley, 62 U.S. 202, 210 (1859) 
(“[A]ctions might be maintained against U.S. corporations for torts); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. 
Brewer, 12 F.2d 818, 820 (D.C. Cir. 1926) (ruling that a U.S. corporation may be liable 
under tort law for the slanderous acts of its employees); United Cigar Stores Co. v. Young, 
36 App. D.C. 390, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1911) (same). 
186 Leveille, supra note 96, at 671–72 (suggesting how extraterritorial application of 
ATS can be done while preserving international comity). 
187 Id. at 670. 
188 Id. 
189 Skinner, supra note 111, at 248–49. 
190 Donald E. Childress III, The Alien Tort Statute, Federalism, and the Next Wave of 
Transnational Litigation, 100 GEO. L.J. 709, 713 (2012). 
191 Bill Reinsch, The Alien Tort Statute’s Impact on the Business Community, WORLD 
COM. REV. 28 (June 2012), http://www.worldcommercereview.com/publications/article_ 
pdf/612. 
192 See Michael D. Goldhaber, The Global Lawyer: The Life and Death of the Corporate 
Alien Tort, THE AMERICAN LAWYER, https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/almID/ 
1202472914956/ (citing a source which provides an exhaustive list of ATS cases brought 
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corporate defendants fall under the scope of the ATS, then courts can 
review—and still give corporate defendants a chance to defend 
themselves on—the merits of the aiding and abetting claims. 
The growing relevance of corporate aiding and abetting liability now 
provides powerful grounds for courts to hear ATS claims against U.S. 
corporations.193 Indeed, the Supreme Court in Sosa stated that it 
originally understood ATS jurisdiction “to be available to enforce a 
small number of international norms that a federal court could properly 
recognize as within the common law.”194 Justice Breyer also 
emphasized in his Kiobel concurrence that the ATS’s “jurisdictional 
reach” should “match the statute’s underlying substantive grasp,”195 
which covers the three principal eighteenth-century offenses: 
(1) piracy, (2) offenses against ambassadors, and (3) violation of safe
conducts.196 Aiding and abetting liability fits within the purview of
these offenses because it was both “accepted by the civilized world”
and “defined with a specificity comparable to the features [of the three
offenses].”197
1. History of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Under the ATS
During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, aiding and abetting
violations of the law of nations were a prime concern of legislators in 
England and colonial America.198 English Judge William Blackstone 
against corporations). See also Susan Simpson, All* Alien Tort Statute Cases Brought 
Between 1789 and 1990, THE VIEW FROM LL2 (Dec. 18, 2010), https://viewfromll2.com/ 
2010/12/18/all-alient-tort-statute-cases-brought-between-1789-and-1990/ (providing an 
extensive list of ATS cases from 1789 to 1990). 
193 See Cassel, supra note 7, at 326 (“[A]iding and abetting international human rights 
crimes by private actors, including corporations and their executives, satisfies the tests set 
forth by the Supreme Court in Sosa for recognition of common law tort claims under the 
ATS”). See also Richard Mason, Civil Liability for Aiding and Abetting, ABA BUSINESS 
LAW TODAY (May 16, 2006), https://businesslawtoday.org/2006/05/civil-liability-for-
aiding-and-abetting/ (providing a good overview of civil liability for aiding and abetting 
with respect to several different types of defendants, including corporations); Lovejoy, 
supra note 12, at 273 (reviewing whether corporations can be liable for aiding and abetting 
in light of Sosa and subsequent cases); Kelly, supra note 35, at 89 (calling for corporate 
liability under the ATS in order to stop corporate complicity in heinous crimes). 
194 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 729 (2004). 
195 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 132 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring). 
196 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 720. 
197 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 128 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
198 Lovejoy, supra note 12, at 250. 
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recognized that aiders and abettors could be punished consistent with 
principal liability.199 He wrote, “A man may be principal in an offence 
. . . in the first degree [if he is the] actor[] or absolute perpetrator of the 
crime; and, in the second degree [if he is] present, aiding, and abetting 
the fact to be done.”200 Similarly, Judge Matthew Hale found that actors 
who “assisted in crimes of violence (trespasses) or mayhem are 
indistinguishable from the primary actors.”201 By 1790, the U.S. passed 
its first law confirming aiding and abetting liability for piracy in U.S. 
courts.202 Aiders and abettors of piracy were treated as principals if they 
failed their “duty” to disclose their knowledge before the commission 
of the piracy203 and were held liable under both common law and 
admiralty law jurisdictions.204 In 1795, Attorney General William 
Bradford reaffirmed the significance of aiding and abetting liability 
when he asserted that aiding and abetting was applicable to cases of 
piracy under the ATS.205 Throughout the 1800s, aiding and abetting 
piracy was distilled into three categories: (1) counsel or procurement 
of piracy, (2) material aid of pirates, and (3) comfort of or profit from 
pirates.206 
Today, courts increasingly recognize ATS claims against U.S. 
corporations based on the theory of civil aiding and abetting.207 In 
accordance with Justice Breyer’s approach from Kiobel, courts have 
considered whether U.S. corporations have aided and abetted offenses 
committed by the “common enemies of all mankind” in violation of the 
law of nations.208 For example, courts have found aiding and abetting 
torture to be a cognizable claim under the ATS because the offense is 
comparable to one of the three principal eighteenth-century offenses of 
199 Id. at 252 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *34). 
200 Id. at 252–53. 
201 Id. at 253. 
202 Id. at 262. 
203 Id. 
204 Id. at 254. 
205 Id. at 263. 
206 Id. at 266. 
207 See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120, 1124 (9th Cir. 2018) (involving an ATS 
claim against a Virginia-based corporation for aiding and abetting child slavery in the Ivory 
Coast); Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 191–94 (2d Cir. 2014) (involving an ATS 
claim against a California-based corporation for aiding and abetting torture in Iraq). 
208 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 132 (2013) (Breyer, J., 
concurring); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1124; Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 191–94. 
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aiding and abetting piracy.209 According to several courts, “today’s 
pirates” include torturers, perpetrators of genocide, and enslavers of 
child workers, just to name a few.210 
In order for a corporation to be liable for civil aiding and abetting, 
the plaintiff must establish two elements: (1) the conduct of the 
defendant who aids and abets (actus reus), and (2) the defendant’s 
mental state (mens rea).211 The actus reus element is met when the 
defendant renders “practical assistance, encouragement, or moral 
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetuation of the 
[offense].”212 With respect to the mens rea element, however, courts are 
split over the required type of mental state.213 On one hand, some courts 
have generally understood the mens rea element to mean that the 
defendant merely knew that his or her actions would facilitate the 
commission of the offense.214 For example, in Prosecutor v. 
Furundzija, the Trial Chamber found the defendant guilty of aiding and 
abetting war crimes because he had the “knowledge that [his] acts 
assist[ed] in the commission of the offence.”215 On the other hand, other 
courts have equated the mens rea element with having a purpose to 
facilitate the commission of the offense.216 The “purpose” standard has 
generally been more difficult for ATS plaintiffs to satisfy.217 For 
example, in United States v. Rasche, the court ruled that even though 
the defendant bank knew that its loan would be used to perpetuate a 
crime, the bank was not guilty of aiding and abetting because it did not 
209 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 254–56 
(2d Cir. 2009) (likening torturers to pirates in that they are “enem[ies] of all mankind” and 
stating that “a plaintiff may plead a theory of aiding and abetting liability [for torture against 
a corporation] under the ATS); Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 
321 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[I]s aiding and abetting a crime against humanity tantamount to 
piracy, or one of the other narrowly defined crimes for which the ATS provided jurisdiction 
in 1789? Again, the weight of authority confirms that it is.”). 
210 Kiobel, 569 U.S. at 133 (2013) (Breyer, J., concurring); Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 
at 1126; Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 180–81; Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 254–56. 
211 Cassel, supra note 7, at 308. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. 
214 Id. at 308–09. 
215 Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 249 (Dec. 10, 1998), 
https://www.icty.org/case/furundzija/4. 
216 Cassel, supra note 7, at 310–15. 
217 Skinner, supra note 111, at 223. 
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act with the purpose to perpetuate that crime.218 The International 
Criminal Court codified the “purpose” standard in Article 25(3)(c), 
which holds responsible one who, “[f]or the purpose of facilitating the 
commission of such a crime, aids, abets, or otherwise assists in its 
commission or its attempted commission.”219 
Although debate persists over which of the two mens rea standards 
is more appropriate for evaluating aiding and abetting claims under the 
ATS, most U.S. courts have applied the “purpose” standard.220 These 
courts have reasoned that while “there is a sufficient international 
consensus for imposing liability on individuals who purposefully aid 
and abet a violation of international law, no such consensus exists for 
imposing liability on individuals who knowingly (but not purposefully) 
aid and abet a violation of international law.”221 
2. Modern Application of Corporate Aiding and Abetting Theory
Under the ATS
In determining whether a corporation acted with the “purpose” to
perpetuate a violation of the “law of nations,” U.S. courts have looked 
to the circumstances of each case.222 Although courts have not outlined 
a clear set of circumstances from which “purposeful intent” can 
be inferred, courts have generally inferred purposeful intent where 
the corporation (1) knew that its assistance would be used by the 
perpetrator to commit the offense, and (2) engaged in bad faith conduct 
outside the ordinary course of business to assist that specific 
218 United States v. Rasche (The Ministries Case), in 14 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS 
BEFORE THE NUREMBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS UNDER CONTROL COUNCIL LAW  
NO. 10, at 662 (1949), https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/NT_war-criminals_ 
Vol-XIV.pdf (“Loans or sales of commodities to be used in an unlawful enterprise may well 
be condemned from a moral standpoint and reflect no credit on the part of the lender or seller 
. . . but the transaction can hardly be said to be a crime.”). 
219 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Plenipotentiaries on the 
Establishment of an International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, 21, 
art. 25.3(c), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998), https://www.icc-cpi.int/resourcelibrary/official-journal/ 
rome-statute.aspx#article25. 
220 Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 834 F.3d 201, 217 (2d Cir. 2016); Mastafa 
v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 191 (2d Cir. 2014); Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736,
765 (9th Cir. 2011); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244,
259 (2d Cir. 2009).
221 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259 (emphasis in original). See also Licci, 
834 F.3d at 217 (citing Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 259); Mastafa, 770 F.3d 
at 191–92 (same). 
222 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 264 (testing the evidence to see if it 
supported an inference of purposeful intent); Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 192 (same). 
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perpetrator.223 For example, in Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, 
which involved an ATS claim against a bank for aiding and abetting 
acts of terrorism in Israel, the court held that the plaintiff stated a valid 
claim that the bank acted “with the purpose” to aid and abet 
terrorism.224 The court reasoned that the bank’s purposeful intent could 
be inferred from the fact that the bank (1) had knowledge that its 
transferred funds would “enabl[e] and assist[] [the perpetrator] to carry 
out terrorist attacks against Jewish civilians in Israel”; and 
(2) “engaged in activity ‘intended to conceal and disguise the true
source, nature, ownership, and control of ’ proceeds of illegal activities
in a scheme that ‘benefitted [the perpetrators].’”225 The bank’s attempt
to “conceal and disguise” its assistance to the perpetrator particularly
led the court to infer that that bank acted with purposeful intent.226
By contrast, in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy 
Inc., which concerned an ATS claim against an oil company for aiding 
and abetting the Sudanese government in committing human rights 
abuse, the court found no purposeful intent on behalf of the company.227 
The court reasoned that while the company may have known that 
Sudanese military forces were committing human rights violations, 
there was no evidence that the company’s assistance was “inherently 
criminal or wrongful” or used to specifically perform those violations 
rather than to facilitate “other activity the Government wanted to 
pursue.”228 Similarly, in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., which involved an 
ATS claim against an energy corporation for aiding and abetting the 
Saddam Hussein regime in committing torture, the court ruled that 
223 See Licci, 834 F.3d at 218–19 (holding that plaintiffs stated a valid aiding and 
abetting claim because defendant corporation knowingly provided practical assistance to the 
perpetrator with intent to “conceal and disguise” the illegal activities); Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 
192–94 (holding that plaintiffs did not meet the mens rea requirement because plaintiffs 
alleged purposeful intent in mere conclusory terms without proof that defendant even had 
knowledge of the perpetrator’s commission of the offense); Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 
582 F.3d at 261–64 (stating that there were insufficient facts to infer that defendants acted 
with purposeful intent because the defendant’s assistance was not inherently criminal or 
shown to have specifically perpetuated the offense). 
224 Licci, 834 F.3d at 219. The claim was sufficient to pass the court’s initial 
jurisdictional inquiry, but the court ultimately found that it did not have subject matter 
jurisdiction over the claim. Id. 
225 Id. 
226 See id. 
227 Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 582 F.3d at 261–64. 
228 Id. 
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purposeful intent could not be inferred from the circumstances.229 The 
court based its ruling on (1) the plaintiff’s failure to sufficiently plead 
that the corporation “had ‘actual knowledge’ that [its] actions would 
contribute to the commission of human rights abuses,” and (2) the 
plaintiff’s failure to show that the corporation took “deliberate steps” 
to assist Saddam Hussein in committing torture.230 Taken together, 
Mastafa and Presbyterian Church of Sudan demonstrate that 
“purposeful intent” will likely not be inferred where the corporation did 
not know of the offense or engage in bad faith conduct outside the 
ordinary course of business to assist the specific perpetrator in 
committing the offense. 
Modern application of corporate aiding and abetting theory under 
the ATS demonstrates that there is now a fair and reasonable standard 
for reviewing ATS claims against U.S. corporations. Concerns that 
ATS liability would overburden U.S. corporations are unwarranted 
because the “purposeful intent” mens rea standard both sets a high bar 
for plaintiffs to clear and ensures that only egregious aiders and abettors 
of human rights violations get persecuted.231 Rather than “categorically 
foreclos[ing]” all U.S. corporations from ATS liability,232 the Supreme 
Court should find jurisdiction to hear ATS claims against domestic 
corporations so that the most deserving aiders and abettors of human 
rights violations are brought to justice. 
229 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192–94 (2d Cir. 2014). 
230 Id. 
231 Skinner, supra note 111, at 223. 
232 Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC, 138 S. Ct. 1386, 1419 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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3. Corporate Aiding and Abetting Liability Going Forward: Doe v.
Nestle, S.A.
A current case in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, Doe v. Nestle,
S.A.,233 demonstrates why courts should have jurisdiction to review
aiding and abetting claims against domestic corporations under the
ATS. There, child slaves were kidnapped and forced to work on cocoa
farms on the Ivory Coast.234 The enslaved children raised an ATS
claim against two American corporations: Nestle USA, a Virginia
corporation, and Cargill, Inc., a Minnesota corporation.235 Together,
these corporations effectively controlled cocoa production on the Ivory
Coast.236 While enslaved children, the plaintiffs labored for up to
fourteen hours a day without pay, and they witnessed other enslaved
children get beaten and tortured for trying to escape.237 Although the
defendant corporations were well aware of the child slavery problem,
they took steps to perpetuate the existing cocoa supply chain system
to depress labor costs.238 The corporations maintained exclusive
buyer/seller relationships with Ivory Coast farmers who enslaved child
laborers, and they visited the supplier farms several times each year.239
To ensure the farmers’ loyalty, the corporations provided the farmers
with financial support, equipment, and personal spending money
outside their contractual agreement.240 The plaintiffs initiated the ATS
claims on the premise that the two corporations aided and abetted child
slavery.241
Before evaluating the merits of the aiding and abetting claims, the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals first found that it had jurisdiction to 
review the case.242 The court held that the defendant corporations’ 
conduct was sufficiently relevant to the ATS’s focus to warrant review 
of the aiding and abetting claims. The court first reasoned that the 
233 See Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 2018) (extending judicial review 
over plaintiffs’ ATS claims against two U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting child 
slavery). 
234 Id. at 1123. 
235 Id. at 1122–23. 
236 Id. at 1123. 
237 Id. at 1122. 
238 Id. at 1123. 
239 Id. 
240 Id. 
241 Id. at 1122. 
242 Id. at 1126. 
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Supreme Court’s holding in Jesner abrogated only ATS jurisdiction 
over foreign corporations; thus, domestic corporations could still be 
defendants in suits brought under the ATS.243 The court then ruled, in 
accordance with prior circuit court opinions,244 that “aiding and 
abetting comes within the ATS’s focus on ‘tort[s] . . . committed in 
violation of the law of nations.’ ”245 Finally, in accordance with the 
“touch and concern” test from Kiobel and the “focus test” from 
RJR Nabisco, the court ruled that the plaintiffs’ claims involved 
enough of a domestic nexus to overcome the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.246 Specifically, the court observed that the plaintiffs’ 
claims “paint[ed] a picture of overseas slave labor that defendants 
perpetuated from headquarters in the United States.”247 These 
circumstances led the Ninth Circuit to order the parties to submit 
amended briefs specifying the merits of the aiding and abetting 
claim.248 
Whether the defendant corporations will be charged for aiding and 
abetting under the ATS is now a question of much debate. Defendants 
Nestle USA and Cargill, Inc., both deny the aiding and abetting claims 
on two main grounds.249 First, they claim that the plaintiffs failed to 
prove that there was domestic corporate activity beyond “mere 
corporate presence” that aided and abetted the offense.250 They claim 
that their payments originating from the United States and visits to the 
243 Id. at 1124. 
244 See Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 185 (2d Cir. 2014) (“[T]he ‘focus’ of 
the ATS is on . . . conduct of the defendant which is alleged by plaintiff to be either a direct 
violation of the law of nations or . . . conduct that constitutes aiding and abetting another’s 
violation of the law of nations.”). See also Adhikari v. Kellogg Brown & Root, Inc., 845 
F.3d 184, 199 (5th Cir. 2017) (stating that aiding and abetting conduct comes within the
focus of the ATS).
245 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1125. 
246 Id. at 1125–26. 
247 Id. at 1126 (emphasis added). 
248 Id. at 1126–27. 
249 See Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Cargill, 
Inc. at ii–iii, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-5133-SVW (9th Cir. 2018) (No. 17-55435); 
Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Nestle USA, Inc. at 
ii, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-5133-SVW (No. 17-55435). 
250 Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Cargill, Inc. 
at 15, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-5133-SVW (No. 17-55435) (quoting Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 124–25 (2013)). 
2020] U.S. Corporate Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute 35 
After Jesner v. Arab Bank, PLC 
Ivory Coast farms are “not enough to overcome the Supreme Court’s 
prohibition on extraterritorial ATS suits.”251 
Second, the defendant corporations claim that, even if there was 
domestic corporate activity beyond “mere corporate presence,” they 
did not act with the requisite specific intent to aid and abet child 
slavery.252 They contend that providing financial support, equipment, 
and personal spending money to maintain the farmers’ “loyalty as 
exclusive suppliers” was a “common business occurrence across 
industries.”253 Such a business relationship, they claim, is not 
inherently illegal and does not prove that they purposely intended to 
assist the farmers in kidnapping and enslaving child workers.254 
The defendants’ claims will likely not pass muster, however, given 
the modern application of the corporate aiding and abetting theory 
under the ATS. First, sufficient domestic corporate activity will likely 
be found because, like the circumstances in Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 
the circumstances in Nestle involve a U.S. corporation that provided 
financial support to an egregious overseas violator of the law of 
nations.255 The corporations in both cases also made decisions for, and 
imported illicitly produced goods from, their overseas counterparts.256 
In Mastafa, Chevron Corporation directed oil shipments and purchased 
oil from its supplier in Iraq, and in Nestle, both Nestle USA and Cargill, 
Inc., oversaw the cocoa plantations and purchased cocoa produced 
251 Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Cargill, Inc. 
at 10, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-5133-SVW (No. 17-55435). 
252 Id. at 15; Answering Brief of Nestle USA, Inc. at 50, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-
5133-SVW (No. 17-55435). 
253 Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Nestle USA, 
Inc. at 15, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-5133-SVW (No. 17-55435). 
254 Id; Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc of Defendant-Appellee Cargill, 
Inc., supra note 251, at 14. 
255 Compare Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2014) (involving an 
ATS claim against a U.S. corporation for aiding and abetting Saddam Hussein’s regime to 
commit torture), with Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1122–23 (involving an ATS claim 
against a U.S. corporation for aiding and abetting Ivory Coast farmers to enslave child 
workers). 
256 Compare Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 191 (describing how defendant corporation made 
purchases and performed financial transactions for the Saddam Hussein regime), with Doe 
v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1126 (reviewing how defendant corporations helped perpetuate
a system built on child labor to depress labor costs in importing cocoa).
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through child slavery from their suppliers on the Ivory Coast.257 Thus, 
just as sufficient domestic activity under the ATS was found in 
Mastafa,258 sufficient domestic activity should also be found in Nestle. 
Second, Nestle USA and Cargill, Inc., likely exhibited the requisite 
intent because, like the banking corporation in Licci v. Lebanese 
Canadian Bank, both corporations in Nestle knew that their suppliers 
were committing egregious human rights violations, and they made 
dubious financial arrangements to ensure that their suppliers remained 
loyal and committed to their scheme.259 Despite the U.S. corporations’ 
contentions that providing “personal spending money” to the farmers 
was “common business” practice, those extracontractual payments 
were “more akin to ‘kickbacks’ ” and served to ensure the farmers’ 
loyalty and exclusivity as suppliers.260 The “personal spending money” 
effectively ensured that no one else would do business with the farmers 
and uncover the particulars of their child slave labor scheme.261 Like 
the dubious financial arrangements in Licci, the provision of “personal 
spending money” was intended, in part, to “ ‘conceal and disguise the 
true source, nature, ownership, and control of’ [the] proceeds of illegal 
activities.”262 Thus, the requisite intent should be inferred from the 
circumstances in Nestle as it was from the circumstances in Licci.263 
*** 
Overall, the scope of the ATS covers U.S. corporations because ATS 
litigation against domestic corporations is consistent with the text, 
purpose, and legislative history of the ATS. In addition, ATS litigation 
against U.S. corporations involves enough of a domestic nexus to 
overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality: it “touches and 
concerns” U.S. territory with “sufficient force,” given that decisions 
leading to human rights violations occur in the U.S., products from 
those violations often come into the U.S., and substantial U.S. interests 
257 Compare Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 175 (describing defendant’s activities with Saddam 
Hussein’s regime), with Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1123 (describing defendant’s 
activities with Ivory Coast farmers). 
258 Mastafa, 770 F.3d at 195 (“[P]laintiffs have alleged specific, domestic conduct in the 
complaint”). 
259 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1126. 
260 Id. 
261 Appellant’s Opening Brief at 7–9, 27 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., No. C-05-5133-SVW (9th 
Cir. 2018) (No. 17-55435). 
262 Licci v. Lebanese Canadian Bank, SAL, 834 F.3d 201, 219 (2d Cir. 2016) (partly 
quoting Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233, 358 (2nd Cir. 2003)). 
263 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1126. 
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are affected. Furthermore, naming U.S. corporations as ATS 
defendants would not substantially endanger U.S. foreign relations 
because doing so would not challenge the sovereignty of foreign 
nations. Finally, courts have increasingly recognized domestic 
corporations as ATS defendants under the theory of civil aiding and 
abetting. Because several U.S. corporations meet both the actus reus 
and “purposeful intent” mens rea standards for aiding and abetting, 
U.S. corporations should be namable defendants under the ATS. 
Concerns that ATS liability would overburden U.S. corporations are 
unwarranted because U.S. corporations can still defend themselves on 
the merits of the ATS claims; the “purposeful intent” mens rea standard 
sets a high bar for plaintiffs to meet, thereby ensuring that only 
egregious aiders and abettors of human rights violations get prosecuted. 
CONCLUSION 
In the global supply chain economy, U.S. corporations are linked 
with numerous instances of human rights violations involving labor 
abuse, child slavery, extrajudicial killings, pollution, and war crimes in 
foreign host states.264 The current Ninth Circuit case, Doe v. Nestle, 
S.A.,265 now provides the United States with an opportunity to hold U.S.
corporations accountable for aiding and abetting egregious human
rights violations. Although the Supreme Court has yet to answer
whether ATS claims may be raised against U.S. corporations, the
existing body of case law and the ATS’s text, purpose, and history
demonstrate that the statute should cover domestic corporations,
including the two corporations in Nestle.
Jurisdiction to review ATS claims against U.S. corporations would 
not pose an undue burden on domestic companies or “embargo [U.S.] 
trade with foreign nations.”266 For example, U.S. corporations can still 
defend themselves on the merits of the aiding and abetting claims by 
showing that they did not act with “purposeful” intent to assist an 
264 See Cassel, supra note 7, at 305–06 (listing several U.S. corporations linked with 
allegations of global human rights violations); see also Making Sense of Managing Human 
Rights Issues in Supply Chains, supra note 7, at 18. 
265 Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 F.3d at 1126 (extending judicial review over plaintiffs’ ATS 
claims against two U.S. corporations for aiding and abetting child slavery). 
266 Brief of Amici Curiae Chamber of Commerce of United States, National Ass’n of 
Manufacturers, & Organization for International Investment in Support of Defendants-
Appellees’ Petitions for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 14, Doe v. Nestle, S.A., 906 
F.3d 1120 (No. 17-55435).
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affiliate in committing a violation of the law of nations.267 Given that 
the standard of proving purposeful intent is a high bar for ATS 
plaintiffs to hurdle,268 the existing legal framework for aiding and 
abetting liability ensures that only the most deserving aiders and 
abettors of human rights violations get prosecuted. 
Furthermore, domestic corporate liability under the ATS would 
incentivize U.S. corporations to undertake better due diligence efforts 
to prevent the occurrence of human rights violations. To avoid liability, 
corporations would identify risks in their supply chains and work closer 
with suppliers to minimize adverse human rights impacts.269 To 
promote transparency and good faith, corporations would also be 
encouraged to conduct compliance audits and disclose their findings.270 
Furthermore, domestic corporations subject to ATS suits would have 
an incentive to withdraw from host states and business relationships 
that cause, create, or are directly linked to adverse human rights 
impacts.271 Holding U.S. corporations accountable under the ATS 
would result in greater overall due diligence efforts. 
Having jurisdiction to review ATS claims against domestic 
corporations would ultimately serve the ATS’s purpose: to provide 
redress to victims of torts committed in violation of the law of 
nations.272 To prevent U.S. corporations from violating human rights 
with impunity, U.S. courts must have the jurisdiction to review 
domestic corporations under the ATS. 
267 Mastafa v. Chevron Corp., 770 F.3d 170, 192–94 (2d Cir. 2014). 
268 Skinner, supra note 111, at 223. 
269 Respecting Human Rights Through Global Supply Chains, supra note 108, at 8. 
270 Id. at 15–18; Making Sense of Managing Human Rights Issues in Supply Chains, 
supra note 7, at 41–42; see also Diane A. Desierto, Shifting Sands in the International 
Economic System: “Arbitrage” in International Economic Law and International Human 
Rights, 49 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1019, 1103–06 (2018) (reviewing pre- and post-audit measures 
and concluding that states and corporations should consolidate their “international human 
rights law commitments, compliance reports, and other relevant records indicating their 
international human rights commitments into a single database accessible to the public”). 
271 Trade Promotion and Human Rights, supra note 156, at 3. 
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